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Consider an extensive-form game in which one agent moves at
each information set. An assessment for such a game lists both a
strategy and a belief for each agent (i.e. information set). The strat-
egy specifies a probability distribution over the agent’s choices,
and the belief specifies a probability distribution over the agent’s
nodes (i.e. the information set’s nodes). In many equilibrium con-
cepts, the agent chooses her1 strategy optimally, given her belief,
the strategies of subsequent agents, and her own payoffs at the
game’s terminal nodes.
The assessment’s strategies determine the probability of reach-
ing any node in the game tree. If every strategy has full support
(i.e. plays every choice with positive probability), then every node
in the tree is reached with positive probability. In this case, it is
natural to assume that every agent (i.e. every information set) cal-
culates its belief over its own nodes by applying the conditional-
probability law (sometimes known as Bayes Rule).
However, if some strategies do not have full support, some
nodes are reached with zero probability. In such a case, there may
be agents that consist entirely of zero-probability nodes. Then,
since the conditional-probability law cannot be applied, it is not at
all obvious how tomodel the reasoning bywhich a zero-probability
agent calculates its belief. Rather, we must awkwardly grapple
E-mail address: pstreuf@uwo.ca.
1 Since I identify an agent with an information set, future paragraphs will refer to
an agent with the pronoun ‘‘it’’ rather than ‘‘he’’ or ‘‘she’’.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jmateco.2015.03.003
0304-4068/© 2015 The Author. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articlwith how to model the reasoning of an agent who unexpectedly
discovers that one of its unreachable nodes has actually been
reached.
This difficult issue can be usefully divided into two sub-issues:
(a) modelling how a zero-probability agent calculates the support
of its belief, and (b) modelling how the agent calculates a proba-
bility distribution over this support. In this paper, I am exclusively
concerned with sub-issue (a).
Economists commonly address both of these sub-issues through
the concept of consistency that was introduced in the path-
breaking work of Kreps and Wilson (1982) (henceforth KW).
Essentially, this concept imagines that a zero-probability agent cal-
culates its belief by a three-stage process: (1) for each of the other
agents it posits some sequence of full-support strategies that con-
verges to that agent’s actual strategy, (2) for each strategy pro-
file in this sequence, it calculates its own belief by means of the
conditional-probability law, and (3) it takes the topological limit
of this sequence of beliefs. This definition is very natural because
it states that what we do not understand (namely, how a zero-
probability agent calculates its belief) must be near to what we do
understand (namely, the conditional-probability law).
Although this topological definition of consistency is natural,
it is both conceptually interesting and computationally useful
to understand consistency without reference to a converging
sequence of full-support assessments. Indeed, most of the papers
cited below contribute to this agenda. This paper contributes
to the same agenda by providing a new characterization of the
supports of consistent assessments, and by proving this result with
unexpectedly elementary mathematics. This new characterization
under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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which will be discussed again below.
My characterization uses three new definitions. The first defi-
nition is a small preliminary step. Recall that an assessment lists a
strategy and a belief for each agent. Since a strategy’s support con-
sists of choices and a belief’s support consists of nodes, it must be
that an assessment’s support consists of both choices and nodes. I
define a ‘‘basement’’ to be a set of choices and nodes that supports
at least one assessment.My task is to characterize those basements
that support at least one consistent assessment.
Second, I derive from an arbitrary basement its implied ‘‘i-
likelihood’’ (i.e. infinite-relative-likelihood) relation <. This binary
relation compares nodes, but does so only in two circumstances.
(1) Suppose one node immediately precedes another. Then the first
is more i-likely (i.e. infinitely more likely) than the second if the
intervening choice is outside the basement (i.e. is played with zero
probability). Further the two nodes are equally i-likely (i.e. neither
can be more i-likely than the other) if the intervening choice is in
the basement (i.e. is played with positive probability). (2) Suppose
two nodes belong to the same agent. Then the two are equally
i-likely if both are in the basement (i.e. both are believed with
positive probability), and the first is more i-likely than the second
if the first is in the basement while the second is not.
This second definition is a minor departure from the literature.
There, infinite-relative-likelihood orderings are derived from
consistent assessments. Such orderings are part of the conditional
probability systems of Myerson (1986), the logarithmic likelihood
ratios of McLennan (1989), the lexicographic probability systems
of Blume et al. (1991), the nonstandard probability systems
of Hammond (1994), and the relative probability systems of
Kohlberg and Reny (1997). In contrast, my relation < is derived
from an arbitrary basement, which may or may not support a
consistent assessment. Accordingly, their orderings are complete
and transitive, while my relation < is typically neither complete
nor transitive.
Third, I introduce the idea of additively representing an order-
ing of the game’s nodes. Since a node can be understood as a set
of choices by Streufert (2012), one can construct an additive rep-
resentation by (a) assigning a number to each choice and then
(b) summing these numbers over the choices in each node. The as-
signment of numbers to choices in step (a) is a function, which I
denote by λ. Because of its resemblance to a probability mass (i.e.
density) function, I call λ a ‘‘mass function’’.
Now I assemble these three definitions into a new concept. A
basement is said to have ‘‘additive i-likelihood’’ if its i-likelihood
relation< has a completionwith an additive representation λ. This
paper proves that a basement has additive i-likelihood if and only
if it supports at least one consistent assessment. In other words,
it shows that additive i-likelihood characterizes the supports of
consistent assessments. This characterization is mymain result, as
reflected in the title of this paper.
Broadly speaking, the definition of consistency has been easier
shown to hold than shown to fail. This difference has arisen be-
cause it is easier to find an assessment sequencewith certain prop-
erties than to show that such a sequence cannot exist. Accordingly,
the necessity of additive i-likelihood is the interesting half of my
characterization of the supports of consistent assessments.
My proof of its necessity is unexpectedly elementary. It relies
solely on a classic result about additive representation fromKrantz
et al. (1971). In brief, this classic result uses only Farkas’ Lemma to
show that the so-called ‘‘cancellation law’’ characterizes those bi-
nary relations that have a completion with an additive represen-
tation. Thus my task reduces to showing that this cancellation law
is satisfied by the i-likelihood relation of a consistent assessment’s
support. Deriving that cancellation law is unexpectedly easy. It fol-
lows directly and intuitively from the implicit assumption that thestrategies of agents are stochastically independent in full-support
Bayesian assessments.
Two subsidiary results can now be discussed naturally. First, I
show that the cancellation law itself is another characterization of
the supports of consistent assessments. Second, if an i-likelihood
relation< has a completionwith an additive representationλ, then
it must necessarily have a transitive completion. Accordingly, the
existence of a transitive completion is a necessary condition for
consistency which is very easily tested (but weaker than additive
i-likelihood). This observation is related to insightful independent
work by Bonanno (2013) on perfect Bayesian equilibrium.
Finally, Section 5 discusses three other characterizations of the
supports of consistent assessments. These other characterizations
do not refer to an i-likelihood relation <, but instead, directly
link a function λ with a basement. These characterizations (of
merely the supports of consistent assessments) are related to the
characterizations of consistency developed by KW (Appendix) and
Perea et al. (1997). I believe that their characterizations should be
much better understood and appreciated for their insights.
This paper serves to correct, simplify, and unify a portion of
this important literature. In particular, Streufert (2006) identifies
a nontrivial gap in the proof of KW Lemma A.1. I bridge this gap.
Then I substantially simplify the proof of Perea et al. (1997), and
show how the two papers are related.
2. Old definitions
2.1. Reviewing the Kreps–Wilson game form
Denote a game form by [C, T , I, (Hi)i, ir , ρ]. There are six ob-
jects. (1) C is a finite set of choices c . (2) T is a collection of nodes
t ⊆ C . These two objects determine the feasibility correspondence
F : T  C by (∀t) F(t) = {c ∉ t|t ∪ {c} ∈ T }.
To continue, (3) I is a set of players i. (4) For each player i,Hi is
a family of agents (i.e. information sets) h ⊆ T . (5) ir ∈ I is the
random player. The random player divides the family ∪i Hi of all
agents into the family Hir of random agents and the family Hs =∪i≠ir Hi of strategic (i.e. personal) agents. Then, the set of nonter-
minal nodes is divided into the collection T r = ∪Hir of random
nodes and the collection T s = ∪Hs of strategic nodes. Finally, C
is divided into the set C r = F(T r) of random choices and the set
C s = F(T s) of strategic choices.
Lastly, (6) ρ : C r → (0, 1] assigns a probability number to each
random choice in such a way that, for each random agent h, ρ|F(h)
is a probability distribution over the agent’s feasible set F(h) ⊆ C .
This specification of a game form is slightly more general than
that of KW. Due to the familiarity of their setup, only three issues
merit discussion. (Full details are in Streufert (2014, Section 2),
with the H there being the ∪i Hi here, and the i there being the Hi
here.)
First, KW p. 867 assumes that each agent has its own actions a.
Such agent-specific actions have come to be known as choices c .
I use this more recent nomenclature. A small consequence of this
is that I speak of the ‘‘random’’ player ir rather than the ‘‘chance’’
player ic in order to limit my use of the symbol c.
Second, KW p. 865 takes nodes as primitive objects. Equiva-
lently, Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) specify nodes as sequences
of choices. More recently, Streufert (2012) shows that such
sequences can be replaced by sets provided that there is no absent-
mindedness. I use the set notation because it is conducive to
additive representation. No-absent-mindedness is not restrictive
because KW (Eq. (2.2)) assume it as part of their assumption of per-
fect recall.
Third, KW pp. 866 and 868 assume that the random player
moves once, at the start of the game. Here the random player
can have nodes, and even nonsingleton agents, anywhere in the
tree. This actually increases tractability because the random player
becomes more like a strategic player. A trivial random player can
be specified by Hir = ∅, which implies T r = C r = ∅.
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A (behavioural) strategy profile σ : C s → [0, 1] assigns a prob-
ability number to each strategic choice in such a way that, for
each strategic agent h, σ |F(h) is a probability distribution over the
agent’s feasible set F(h) ⊆ C s. A belief system β : T s → [0, 1]
assigns a probability number to each strategic node in such a way
that, for each strategic agent h, β|h is a probability distribution over
h ⊆ T s. An assessment (σ , β) consists of a strategy profile and a
belief system. Such an assessment is full-support Bayesian if σ as-
sumes only positive values and
(∀h ∈ Hs)(∀t ∈ h) β(t) =

c∈t
(ρ ∪ σ)(c)
t ′∈h

c∈t ′
(ρ ∪ σ)(c) .
Finally, an assessment is consistent if it is the limit of a sequence of
full-support Bayesian assessments.
2.3. Reviewing the support of an assessment
As in KW, let the support of an assessment (σ , β) be the union of
the support of σ : C s → [0, 1] and the support of β : T s → [0, 1].
Note that the support of an assessment is a subset of C s ∪ T s, and
accordingly, it consists of both choices and nodes.
Fig. 1 provides an example. Its game tree is essentially that of
Kreps andRamey (1987, Fig. 1). A casual interpretation of this game
treemight be that youmanage twoworkers, that each has a switch,
and that a lamp turns on exactly when both switches are on. You
can observe the lamp but not the switches, and then if the lamp
is dark, you can choose to penalize either the first worker or the
second worker.
The figure also specifies an assessment: the strategy profile σ
is given by the numbers without boxes and the belief system β
is given by the numbers within boxes. Casually, this assessment
might describe an equilibrium-like situation in which both work-
ers work because (a) they think that if the light is dark, you would
place probability 0.2 on both workers dozing, probability 0.4 on
only the first worker dozing, and probability 0.4 on only the sec-
ond worker dozing, (b) they see that this belief would induce you
to randomize between the two punishments, and (c) the threat of
this randomized penalty motivates them both to work.
Finally, the figure shows this assessment’s support: the choices
and nodes in the support are encircled. In particular, the choices
in the support arew1, w2, p1, and p2, and the nodes in the support
are {}, {w1}, {d1, d2}, {d1, w2}, and {w1, d2}.
3. New definitions
3.1. Basements
As we have seen, the support of an assessment is a subset of
C s ∪ T s. Let a basement2 b be a subset of C s ∪ T s such that
(∀h ∈ Hs) F(h) ∩ b ≠ ∅ and h ∩ b ≠ ∅.
It is easily shown that a subset of C s∪T s is a basement iff it supports
at least one assessment. For example, the encircled choices and
nodes in Fig. 2 constitute a basement. That basement supports
many assessments, including the assessment of Fig. 1.
2 Closely related is the KW (p. 880) concept of ‘‘basis’’, which is defined to be an
arbitrary subset of C s ∪ T s .3.2. The i-likelihood relation < of a basement b
This paragraph mechanically defines the i-likelihood relation <
of an arbitrary basement b. Let
≻Cs = { (t, t ∪ {c}) | c ∈ F(t) and c ∈ C s r b },
≈Cs = { (t, t ∪ {c}) | c ∈ F(t) and c ∈ C s ∩ b }
∪ { (t ∪ {c}, t) | c ∈ F(t) and c ∈ C s ∩ b },
≈C r = { (t, t ∪ {c}) | c ∈ F(t) and c ∈ C r }
∪ { (t ∪ {c}, t) | c ∈ F(t) and c ∈ C r },
≻T s = { (t1, t2) | (∃h ∈ Hs) t1 ∈ h ∩ b and t2 ∈ h r b }, and
≈T s = { (t1, t2) | (∃h ∈ Hs) {t1, t2} ⊆ h ∩ b }.
Let≻ be the union of≻Cs and≻T s . Let≈ be the union of≈Cs ,≈C r ,
and ≈T s . Finally, let < be the union of ≻ and ≈. I call this < the
i-likelihood relation of b.
As the notation suggests, ≻ and ≈ are the asymmetric and
symmetric parts of <. Further, ≻Cs ,≈Cs ,≈C r ,≻T s , and ≈T s are
mutually disjoint. (These facts are straightforwardly proved by
Streufert, 2014, Lemma 3.1).)
I now interpret < and its component relations. This paragraph
makes a few initial observations. Each of these relations compares
nodes. The definitions of ≻Cs and ≈Cs concern whether certain
choices belong to the basement b. The definitions of ≻T s and ≈T s
concern whether certain nodes belong to the basement b. The
definition of≈C r is unconcerned with b.
The gist of <’s interpretation is this. The asymmetric relation≻
contains a given pair of nodes precisely when the basement dic-
tates that the first node is more i-likely (i.e. infinitely more likely)
than the second. Meanwhile, the symmetric relation ≈ contains
a given pair of nodes precisely when the basement dictates that
neither of the nodes can be more i-likely than the other. I have
introduced the word ‘‘i-likelihood’’ in lieu of the familiar phrase
‘‘infinite relative likelihood’’ only because it is grammatically more
convenient.
This and the next four paragraphs discuss each of the five com-
ponents of < in detail. First consider ≻Cs . As with any relation,
the notations (t1, t2) ∈ ≻Cs and t1≻Cs t2 are equivalent. Thus
t1≻Cs t2 iff node t1 immediately precedes node t2 and the strate-
gic choice leading from t1 to t2 is not in b (i.e. is played by b with
zero probability). For example, Fig. 2 shows that {}≻Cs{d1}, that is,
that the origin {} is more i-likely than the node {d1}. This holds be-
cause the intervening choice d1 is not in b (i.e. is played by b with
zero probability). Similarly, {d1}≻Cs{d1, d2} and {w1}≻Cs{w1, d2}.
Second, consider≈Cs . Both t1≈Cs t2 and t2≈Cs t1 hold if t1 im-
mediately precedes t2 and the strategic choice leading from t1 to
t2 is in b (i.e. is played by b with positive probability). In such a
case, t1 and t2 are ‘‘equally i-likely’’. For example, Fig. 2 shows
that {}≈Cs{w1}, that {w1}≈Cs{w1, w2}, that {d1}≈Cs{d1, w2}, that{d1, d2}≈Cs{d1, d2, p1}, and that ≈Cs contains the five other pairs
that end in terminal nodes like the last one listed. Further, the con-
verses of these nine pairs are also in≈Cs because≈Cs was defined
to be symmetric.
Third, this notion of being ‘‘equally i-likely’’ applies not only
to strategic choices, but also to random choices, which are played
with positive probability by assumption. Accordingly, the defini-
tion of≈C r states that both t1≈C r t2 and t2≈C r t1 hold if a random
choice leads from t1 to t2. Unlike the other four components of <,
this≈C r depends only on the game tree and not on the basement.
For example, Fig. 2’s game tree has no random choices, and hence
≈C r is empty.
Fourth, the definition of≻T s states that a node in the support of
an agent’s belief is more i-likely than any node of the agent outside
the support. For example, Fig. 2 shows {w1}≻T s{d1}.
Fifth, the definition of ≈T s states that two nodes in the sup-
port of an agent’s belief are equally i-likely. For example, Fig. 2
shows {d1, d2}≈T s{d1, w2} and {d1, w2}≈T s{w1, d2}. The relation
40 P.A. Streufert / Journal of Mathematical Economics 59 (2015) 37–46Fig. 1. An assessment and its support.Fig. 2. A basement b and its i-likelihood relation <. This < does not have a transitive completion.≈T s also contains ({d1, d2}, {w1, d2}), and because the relation is
symmetric, the converses of the three pairs already mentioned.
(The relation≈T s also contains five reflexive pairs for the five nodes
in the support b. The absence or presence of reflexive pairs in≈T s
is irrelevant.)
The typical < is pervasively incomplete in the sense that it fails
to compare many pairs of nodes. For instance, in Fig. 2’s example,
neither {} < {d1, d2} nor {d1, d2} < {}. In general, consider any
two nodes t1 and t2 such that (a) neither t1 nor t2 is an immediate
predecessor of the other and (b) t1 and t2 are not in the same agent.Such a situation arises at least once in any choice-set game with
|T | ≥ 3. By (a), the two nodes cannot be ordered into a pair be-
longing to≻Cs ,≈Cs , or≈C r . By (b) the two cannot be ordered into
a pair belonging to ≻T s or ≈T s . Hence the two cannot be ordered
into a pair belonging to <.
Further, the typical < is also intransitive. This accords with its
incompleteness. For instance, in Fig. 2’s example, transitivity is vi-
olated by the lack of {} < {d1, d2}. In general, such an intransitivity
must occur whenever one agent follows another, regardless of the
basement under consideration.
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departure from the literature.3 There, infinite-relative-likelihood
orderings are derived from consistent assessments. Such orderings
are part of (1) the conditional probability systems of Myerson
(1986), which are built on the mathematical foundations of Rényi
(1955); (2) the logarithmic likelihood ratios of McLennan (1989);
(3) the lexicographic probability systems of Blume et al. (1991);
(4) the nonstandard probability systems of Hammond (1994) and
Halpern (2010), which are built on the mathematical foundations
of Robinson (1973); and (5) the relative probability systems of
Kohlberg and Reny (1997).
My relation< differs from theirs in severalways. (a)My relation
< is derived from an arbitrary basement, which may or may not
be the support of a consistent assessment. (b) My < is incomplete
and intransitive while their orderings are complete and transitive.
(c) The construction of my < is relatively explicit. (d) My < is
uniquely determined by an assessment’s basement while many of
their orderings are typically compatible with a single assessment.
(This multiplicity corresponds to the possibility of my < having
multiple completions in the sense of the next paragraph.)
3.3. I-likelihood mass functions λ
As we have seen, a typical i-likelihood relation < is incomplete.
A completion of < is a complete extension of <. In other words, a
complete <∗ is said to be a completion of < if for all t1 and t2
t1 ≻ t2 ⇒ t1 ≻∗ t2 and
t1 ≈ t2 ⇒ t1 ≈∗ t2,
where ≻∗ and ≈∗ are the asymmetric and symmetric parts of <∗.
Any < has at least one (possibly intransitive) completion.
Since T is finite, the existence of a transitive completion is
equivalent to the existence of a function ϕ : T → R which rep-
resents4 a completion of < in the sense that for all t1 and t2
t1 ≻ t2 ⇒ ϕ(t1) > ϕ(t2) and
t1 ≈ t2 ⇒ ϕ(t1) = ϕ(t2). (1)
For example, Fig. 2’s i-likelihood relation does not have a transi-
tive completion since {d1} ≻ {d1, d2} and yet {d1} ≈ {d1, w2} ≈
{d1, d2}. Accordingly, that figure’s i-likelihood relation does not
have a completion that can be represented by a ϕ.
Stronger than the existence of a transitive completionwould be
the existence of a function λ : C → Rwhose nodal sums represent
a completion of < in the sense that for all t1 and t2
t1 ≻ t2 ⇒

c∈t1
λ(c) >

c∈t2
λ(c) and
t1 ≈ t2 ⇒

c∈t1
λ(c) =

c∈t2
λ(c).
(2)
This is stronger than the existence of a transitive completion be-
cause (2) implies that (1) holds with the special functional form
ϕ(t) = c∈t λ(c). For brevity, we will often omit mentioning the
nodal sums

c∈t λ(c) and simply say that such a λ additively rep-
resents a completion of <.
3 The ordering in Bonanno (2013) is discussed in Note 8.
4 I use the term ‘‘represent’’ as it is used in standard consumer theory. In contrast,
much of the bibliography’s non-economics literature would use ‘‘represent’’ to
meanmy ‘‘represent a completion of’’. If wewere studying complete relations, these
two meanings of ‘‘represent’’ would be equivalent since the only completion of a
complete relation is the relation itself. Interestingly, a typical i-likelihood relation
is incomplete, and thus my choice of terminology is substantial.For example, Fig. 3’s i-likelihood relation < has a completion
that is represented by the nodal sums of a function λ. Such a func-
tion λ : C → R is given by the numbers without boxes that appear
over the choices, and its nodal sums

c∈t λ(c) are given by the
numbers within boxes that appear over the nodes. If brevity were
important, as it often is, I would omit mentioning the nodal sums,
and simply say that the figure’s λ additively represents a comple-
tion of the figure’s <.
Because of its resemblance to a probability mass function, I call
a function λ : C → R a mass function. To explore this resem-
blance, let p : Ω → [0, 1] be a probability mass (i.e. ‘‘density’’)
function defined on a finite setΩ of statesω. Then, as we all know,
the probability of any event e ⊆ Ω can be calculated by the sum
ω∈e p(ω). Analogously, (1) a choice c ∈ C is like a state ω ∈ Ω ,
(2) a mass function λ : C → R is like a probability mass function
p : Ω → [0, 1], (3) a node t ⊆ C is like an event e ⊆ Ω , and (4) a
nodal sum

c∈t λ(c) is like a sumof the form

ω∈e p(ω). Although
this analogy is quite useful, it is imperfect: while the values of p are
nonnegative and sum to one, the values of λ can be negative and
need not sum to one.
It is natural to call λ an i-likelihood mass function, to call λ(c)
the i-likelihood of the choice c , and to call

c∈t λ(c) the i-likelihood
of the node t . Further, it is natural to say that a basement has
additive i-likelihood iff its i-likelihood relation has a completion
with an additive representation. This is the meaning of ‘‘additive
i-likelihood’’ in the paper’s title.
4. Main characterizations
4.1. Some abstract representation theory
Although additive representation is new in this context, it is
familiar in the abstract. Accordingly, in this subsection, consider an
arbitrary finite set C and an arbitrary binary relation < comparing
subsets of C . In this abstract context, say that λ : C → R additively
represents< if (2) holds for the asymmetric and symmetric parts of
<.
Next let a cancelling sample from< be a finite indexed collection
⟨(sm, tm)⟩Mm=1 of pairs (sm, tm) taken from < such that
(∀c) |{m|c ∈ sm}| = |{m|c ∈ tm}|.
Note that the sample is taken ‘‘with replacement’’ in the sense that
a pair can appear more than once. Further, by the equation, every
choice appearing on the left side of some pair is ‘‘cancelled’’ by the
identical choice appearing on the right side of that or some other
pair. For example, if {c, c ′} < {c, c ′}, then a cancelling sample from
< is given by M = 1 and (s1, t1) = ({c, c ′}, {c, c ′}). The relation
< is said to satisfy the cancellation law if every cancelling sample
from <must be taken from the symmetric part of <.
It is well-known that the cancellation law is equivalent to the
existence of a completion with an additive representation.5 This
result appears prominently in the abstract representation theory
of Krantz et al. (1971, Sections 2.3 and 9.2) and Narens (1985, pp.
263–265).6 It also appears in the early foundations of probability
theory, in the work of Kraft et al. (1959) and Scott (1964).
5 This result can be regarded as a generalization of Suzumura (1976, Theorem 3)
in the social-choice literature. There it is shown that a relation on a finite set has
a transitive completion iff every cycle in the relation contains no pairs from the
asymmetric part of the relation. That result follows from the general result here by
identifying every c with the singleton {c} that contains it.
6 These classic results over discrete spaces complement Debreu (1960)’s
derivation of an additive representation over continuum product spaces. Debreu
imposes weaker cancellation assumptions (e.g., Debreu, 1960, Assumption 1.3) and
compensates with topological assumptions.
42 P.A. Streufert / Journal of Mathematical Economics 59 (2015) 37–46Fig. 3. A basement b, its i-likelihood relation <, and an i-likelihood mass function λwhose nodal sums (which appear in the boxes) represent a completion of <.It is also well-known that proving this result requires nothing
more than Farkas’ Lemma, which in turn requires nothing more
than undergraduate linear algebra. Fact 4.1 is a very minor adap-
tation. It provides an integer-valuedmass function by employing a
version of Farkas’ Lemma for rational matrices.
Fact 4.1. Let C be a finite set, and let < be a relation comparing
subsets of C. Then < satisfies the cancellation law iff it has a comple-
tion represented additively by a function λ : C → Z. (Proof A.2.)
4.2. Theorem
Theorem 4.2(a⇔d) shows that a basement has additive i-
likelihood iff it supports at least one consistent assessment. In
other words, it shows that additive i-likelihood characterizes the
supports of consistent assessments. This equivalence is my main
result, as reflected in the title of the paper. It can be regarded as
a convenient reformulation of KW Lemma A.1, which will be dis-
cussed in Section 5.
In addition, Theorem 4.2(a⇔b) shows that the supports of con-
sistent assessments can be characterized by the cancellation law.
This characterization is new. Finally, Theorem 4.2(c⇐d) shows
that integer-valuedness is not restrictive.
Theorem 4.2. The following are equivalent for any basement b.
(a) b is the support of at least one consistent assessment.
(b) b’s i-likelihood relation obeys the cancellation law.
(c) b’s i-likelihood relation has a completion represented additively
by an integer-valued mass function.
(d) b’s i-likelihood relation has a completion represented additively
by a (real-valued) mass function. (Proof A.5.)
The remainder of this subsection discusses the theorem’s proof
(i.e. Proof A.5). Essentially, (a) implies (b) by Lemma4.3; (b) implies(c) by Fact 4.17; (c) implies (d) obviously; and (d) implies (a) in a
fairly standard way.
Interestingly, the proof provides some intuition as to why the
supports of consistent assessmentsmust have additive i-likelihood.
In full-support Bayesian assessments, the agents’ strategies are im-
plicitly assumed to be stochastically independent. Because of this
independence, the probability of reaching any node is a product of
positive probabilities. Lemma 4.3 uses these products to establish
the cancellation law, which in turn, leads to additive representa-
tion by Fact 4.1. Thus the stochastic independence of full-support
Bayesian assessments leads to the additive i-likelihood of a consis-
tent assessment’s support.
Lemma 4.3. Suppose an assessment is consistent. Then its support’s
i-likelihood relation < satisfies the cancellation law.
Proof. Let (σ , β) be a consistent assessment. By the definition
of consistency, there is a sequence ⟨(σn, βn)⟩∞n=1 of full-support
Bayesian assessments that converges to (σ , β). Then let < be the
i-likelihood relation of the support of (σ , β), and let ⟨(sm, tm)⟩Mm=1
be a cancelling sample from <.
By the definition of a cancelling sample,
(∀n)
M
m=1

c∈sm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) =
M
m=1

c∈tm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c).
Thus
(∀n)
M
m=1

c∈tm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈sm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) = 1,
7 In this argument, the cancellation law from representation theory serves
as a natural stepping stone. The proof without the stepping stone would have
similarities with the insightful independent work of Oliu-Barton (2014, Proof of
Proposition 2) regarding the asymptotic value of a stochastic game. Both arguments
use Farkas’ Lemma.
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lim
n
M
m=1

c∈tm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈sm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) = 1. (3)
Yet by Lemma A.3 at (t1, t2) = (sm, tm), we have (note that sm is in
the denominator)
(∀ sm ≻ tm) lim
n

c∈tm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈sm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) = 0 and
(∀ sm ≈ tm) lim
n

c∈tm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈sm
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) ∈ (0,∞).
(4)
If ⟨(sm, tm)⟩Mm=1 had a pair from≻, Eqs. (3) and (4)would contradict
the product rule for limits. Hence no such pair exists. 
4.3. I-Likelihood numbers ‘‘count steps below path’’
In probability theory, an event e is at least as probable as any of
its subsets, and thus, a probability mass function is nonnegative-
valued. In contrast, a node t is at most as i-likely as any of its
subnodes (i.e. predecessors), and thus, an i-likelihood mass func-
tion is nonpositive-valued. The following remark provides details.
Its proof is uncomplicated.
Remark 4.4. Suppose b’s i-likelihood relation has a completion
represented additively by λ. Then (a) λ(C r) = {0}, (b) λ(C s ∩ b) =
{0}, and (c) λ(C s r b) ⊆ R−−. Parts (a)–(c) imply that λ is non-
positive-valued. (This remark follows from Lemma A.4.)
In brief, parts (a) and (b) show that positive-probability choices
get zero i-likelihood, and part (c) shows that zero-probability
choices get negative i-likelihood. Thus a node’s i-likelihood
c∈t λ(c) is a measure of how far the node t is below the positive-
probability (i.e. ‘‘equilibrium’’) path. This measure is slightly more
sophisticated than (the negative of) the number of zero-probability
choices in the node because each zero-probability choice can be
assigned its own negative i-likelihood number.
Finally, note that the negative i-likelihood numbers of the pre-
vious sentence can be made integers by Theorem 4.2(c⇐d). In
this sense, a node’s i-likelihood number counts how many whole
‘‘steps’’ the node is below the positive-probability (i.e. ‘‘equilib-
rium’’) path.
4.4. A useful digression
As discussed in Section 3.3, having a completion with an addi-
tive representation implies having a transitive completion. Hence
Corollary 4.5 follows easily fromTheorem4.2 (and does not use the
full force of the theorem).8
Corollary 4.5. If an assessment is consistent, then its support’s i-
likelihood relation has a transitive completion.
8 Bonanno (2013) develops a new equilibrium concept which lies strictly
between sequential equilibrium and subgame-perfect equilibrium. His concept
incorporates an ordering over nodes which would, in the language of this paper, be
called a transitive completion of the assessment’s basement’s i-likelihood relation.
Accordingly, Corollary 4.5 is related to his result that sequential equilibrium implies
his new concept. He proves his result by appealing to KW Lemma A.1. My work
concerns the proof of that fundamental result. See Streufert (2014, Appendix B) for
further discussion of Bonanno’s insightful independent work.Corollary 4.5 provides a weak but easily-tested necessary con-
dition for consistency. For example, consider Fig. 2’s basement.
Section 3.3 showed that this basement’s i-likelihood relation does
not have a transitive completion. Thus Corollary 4.5 implies the in-
consistency of any assessment that is supported by this basement.
One of many such assessments is the assessment of Fig. 1.
5. Other characterizations
It can be useful to characterize additive i-likelihood (and there-
by the supports of consistent assessments) without direct refer-
ence to a relation <. Towards that end, say that a function λ : C →
R justifies a basement b if
λ(C r) = {0}, (5a)
λ(C s ∩ b) = {0}, (5b)
λ(C s r b) ⊆ R−−, and (5c)
(∀h ∈ Hs) h ∩ b = argmax
t∈h

c∈t
λ(c). (5d)
(5a–c) are identical to the conclusions of Remark 4.4. As discussed
earlier, these allow us to say that the

c∈t λ(t) of a node t counts
howmany ‘‘steps’’ that node is below the positive-probability path.
In these terms, (5d) says that the support of an agent’s belief con-
sists of those nodes that are the fewest number of steps below the
positive-probability path.
Proposition 5.1. λ justifies b iff λ additively represents a completion
of the i-likelihood relation of b. (Proof A.6.)
By this proposition and Theorem 4.2 together, λ-justification
characterizes the supports of consistent assessments. Further, this
characterization is closely related to a portion of the characteriza-
tions of consistency in KW (Lemmas A.1 and A.2) and Perea et al.
(1997, Theorem 3.1). Note that these two papers characterize not
merely the supports of consistent assessments, as I do here, but
more substantially, the consistent assessments themselves. I be-
lieve that their important results have been largely overlooked, and
that they deserve much more recognition.
First consider KW.9 For my purposes, say that a function K :
C s → N justifies a basement b if
(∀c ∈ C s) c ∈ b iff K(c) = 0, and (6a)
(∀h ∈ Hs)(∀t ∈ h) t ∈ b iff t ∈ argmin
t ′∈h

c∈t ′
K(c). (6b)
KW (p. 887) call such a K a ‘‘labelling’’. The following remark implies
that, for all c ∈ C s, the i-likelihood λ(c) is related to the labelling
K(c) by−λ(c) = K(c).
Remark 5.2. The following are equivalent.
(a) λ(C) ⊆ Z and λ justifies b.
(b) λ(C r) = {0} and −λ|Cs is a K that justifies b. (The proof is
simple and like that of Streufert, 2014, Lemma 5.2.)
By the combination of this remark, Proposition 5.1, and Theo-
rem4.2, K -justification characterizes the supports of consistent as-
sessments. This characterization slightly extends KW Lemma A.1 in
the sense that my game form’s random player is more flexible (re-
call Section 2.1).More importantly, it corrects their proof: Streufert
9 Let T r be {∅}, let C r be their W , let t ∈ T s be their x ∈ X , let C s be their A,
and let (σ , β) be their (π, µ). Also note that I omit the condition (∀h ∈ Hs)(∃c ∈
F(h)) K(c) = 0 from their definition of a labelling because this condition is implied
by (6a) and the definition of a basement.
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proof has a significant gap. This correction is important because
their Lemma A.1 undergirds all of their paper’s theorems, includ-
ing their oft-cited existence theorem.
Second consider Perea et al. (1997).10 For my purposes, say that
a basement b is justified by ε : C s r b → (0, 1) if
(∀h ∈ Hs)(∀t ∈ h) t ∈ b iff t ∈ argmax
t ′∈h

c∈t ′∩(Csrb)
ε(c),
where the product over the empty set is defined to be one. Note
that if b is the support of (σ , β), then b is justified by ε : C0(σ )→
(0, 1) iff
(∀h ∈ Hs)(∀t ∈ h) β(t) > 0 iff t ∈ argmax
t ′∈h

c∈t ′∩C0(σ )
ε(c),
where C0(σ ) = {c ∈ C s|σ(c) = 0} is the set of strategic choices
that are played by σ with zero probability. This latter condition is
equivalent to condition (1) of Perea et al. (1997, Theorem 3.1). The
values of ε can usefully be called ‘‘error likelihoods’’, for as Perea
(2001, p. 75) points out, they correlate positively with the rela-
tive likelihoods of different errors (i.e. different zero-probability
choices).
In part (c) of the following remark, eλ|Csrb denotes the restric-
tion of the composition eλ = exp ◦ λ to C s r b. Hence, for all
c ∈ C s r b, the i-likelihood λ(c) is related to the error likelihood
ε(c) by eλ(c) = ε(c).
Remark 5.3. λ justifies b iff (a) λ(C r) = {0}, (b) λ(C s ∩ b) = {0},
and (c) eλ|Csrb is an ε that justifies b. (The proof is simple and like
that of Streufert, 2014, Lemma 5.3.)
By the combination of this remark, Proposition 5.1, and The-
orem 4.2, ε-justification characterizes the supports of consistent
assessments. This equivalence slightly extends a portion of Perea
et al. (1997, Theorem 3.1) in the sense that (a) my random player
is more flexible and (b) I derive a function with integer rather than
real values. More importantly, my mathematics is at a lower level:
while their proof uses the separating hyperplane theorem, mine
uses algebra alone.
In this manner the last two remarks serve to correct, simplify,
and unify an important literature which I believe deserves much
greater recognition.
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Fact A.1 (Farkas’ Lemma for Rational Matrices). Let D ∈ Qdp and
E ∈ Qep be two rational matrices. Then the following are equivalent
(Dλ ≫ 0 means every element of Dλ is positive and δT means the
transpose of δ).
(a) (∃λ ∈ Zp) Dλ≫ 0 and Eλ = 0.
(b) Not (∃δ ∈ Zd+ r {0})(∃ε ∈ Ze) δTD+ εTE = 0.
(From Krantz et al., 1971, pp. 62–63 with D replacing [αi]m′i=1 and E
replacing [βi]m′′i=1. Farkas’ Lemma for real matrices appears in Farkas,
1902, and Vohra, 2005, pp. 16–18.)
Proof A.2 (For Fact 4.1). Let C be any finite set, and let < be any
relation comparing subsets of C .
Sufficiency of the Cancellation Law. Suppose < satisfies the
cancellation law.
This paragraph provides some notation. For any t ⊆ C , define
the row vector 1t ∈ {0, 1}|C | by 1tc = 1 if c ∈ t and 1tc = 0 if c ∉ t .
Then define the matrices D = [1s − 1t ]s≻t and E = [1s − 1t ]s≈t
whose rows are indexed by the pairs of the relations≻ and≈.
This paragraph will argue that there cannot be column vectors
δ ∈ Z|≻|+ r {0} and ε ∈ Z|≈| such that δTD + εTE = 0. To see this,
suppose that there were such δ and ε. By the symmetry of ≈, we
may define ε+ ∈ Z|≈|+ by
(∀s ≈ t) (ε+)(s,t) =

ε(s,t) − ε(t,s) if ε(s,t) − ε(t,s) ≥ 0
0 otherwise

so that εTE = εT+E. Thus we have δ ∈ Z|≻|+ r {0} and ε+ ∈ Z|≈|+
such that δTD+ εT+E = 0. Now define the sequence ⟨(sm, tm)⟩Mm=1
of pairs from < in such a way that every pair (s, t) from≻ appears
δ(s,t) times and every pair (s, t) from ≈ appears (ε+)(s,t) times.
The equality δTD + εT+E = 0 yields that this sequence satisfies
(∀c)|{m|c ∈ sm}| = |{m|c ∈ tm}|, and δ ∈ Z|≺|+ r {0} yields that
it contains at least one pair from≻. By the cancellation law, this is
impossible.
Since the result of the previous paragraph is equivalent to con-
dition (b) of Fact A.1, there is a vector λ ∈ Z|C | such that Dλ ≫ 0
and Eλ = 0. By the definitions of D and E, this is equivalent to λ
being a mass function representing a completion of <.
Necessity of the Cancellation Law.11 Suppose λ represents a com-
pletion of < and that ⟨(sm, tm)⟩Mm=1 is a cancelling sample from <.
By the definition of a cancelling sample,
M
m=1

c∈sm
λ(c) =
M
m=1

c∈tm
λ(c).
Yet by representation,
(∀ sm ≻ tm)

c∈sm
λ(c) >

c∈tm
λ(c) and
(∀ sm ≈ tm)

c∈sm
λ(c) =

c∈tm
λ(c).
The last two sentences contradict one another if ⟨(sm, tm)⟩Mm=1 has
a pair from≻. Hence no such pair exists. 
11 This half is easy and is included only to round out the picture. It is a good place
to begin if the cancellation law is unfamiliar.
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Bayesian assessments that converges to (σ , β), and that < is the i-
likelihood relation of the support of (σ , β). Then
(∀ t1 ≻ t2) lim
n

c∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) = 0 and
(∀ t1 ≈ t2) lim
n

c∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) ∈ (0,∞)
(where

c∈{}(ρ ∪ σn)(c) is defined to be one).
Proof. Let b denote the support of (σ , β).
This paragraph shows
(∀ t1 ≻Cs t2) lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) = 0. (7)
Suppose t1 ≻Cs t2. By the definition of≻Cs , there exists c ∈ C s r b
such that c ∈ F(t1) and t1 ∪ {c} = t2. Thus,
lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) = limn σn(c) = σ(c) = 0
where the first equality holds since c ∉ t1 by the definition of F ,
and the third equality holds because c ∈ C s r b.
This paragraph shows
(∀ t1 ≈Cs t2) lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) ∈ (0,∞). (8)
Suppose t1 ≈Cs t2. By the definition of≈Cs , there exists c ∈ C s ∩ b
such that either [a] c ∈ F(t1) and t1 ∪ {c} = t2, or symmetrically
[b] c ∈ F(t2) and t2 ∪ {c} = t1. In case [a],
lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) = limn σn(c) = σ(c) ∈ (0, 1],
where the first equality holds since c ∉ t1 by the definition of F ,
and the set inclusion holds since c ∈ C s ∩ b. In case [b],
lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) = limn
1
σn(c)
= 1
σ(c)
∈ [1,∞)
where the first equality holds since c ∉ t2 by the definition of F ,
and the set inclusion holds since c ∈ C s ∩ b.
In a similar fashion, this paragraph shows
(∀ t1 ≈C r t2) lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) ∈ (0,∞). (9)
Suppose t1 ≈C r t2. By the definition of ≈C r , there exists c ∈ C r
such that either, [a] c ∈ F(t1) and t1 ∪ {c} = t2, or symmetrically
[b] c ∈ F(t2) and t2 ∪ {c} = t1. In case [a], c ∉ t1 and thus
lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) = limn ρ(c) ∈ (0, 1].In case [b], c ∉ t2 and thus
lim
n

c′∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′)
c′∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c ′) = limn
1
ρ(c)
∈ [1,∞).
This paragraph notes that if t1 and t2 belong to the same h ∈ Hs,
and if β(t1) > 0, then
lim
n

c∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) = limn

c∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)/
t∈h

c∈t
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)/
t∈h

c∈t
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
= lim
n
βn(t2)
βn(t1)
= β(t
2)
β(t1)
.
The second equality follows from the conditional-probability law,
which applies over h because each (σn, βn) was assumed to be
Bayesian. The third follows from this paragraph’s assumption that
β(t1) > 0.
This paragraph shows
(∀ t1 ≻T s t2) lim
n

c∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) =
β(t2)
β(t1)
= 0. (10)
Suppose t1 ≻T s t2. By the definition of≻T s , we have that (a) t1 and
t2 belong to the same h ∈ Hs, (b) t1 ∈ T s ∩ b, and (c) t2 ∈ T s r b.
The first equality in (10) holds by the last paragraph, (a), and (b),
because (b) implies β(t1) > 0. The second equality follows from
(c), because (c) implies β(t2) = 0.
Similarly, this paragraph shows
(∀ t1 ≈T s t2) lim
n

c∈t2
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
c∈t1
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) =
β(t2)
β(t1)
∈ (0,∞). (11)
Suppose t1 ≈T s t2. By the definition of≈T s , we have that (a) t1 and
t2 belong to the same h ∈ Hs, and (b) {t1, t2} ⊆ T s∩b. The equality
in (11) holds by the next-to-last paragraph, (a), and (b), because
(b) implies β(t1) > 0. The set membership also follows from (b),
because (b) also implies β(t2) > 0.
The lemma’s conclusion follows from (7)–(11) and from the
definitions of≻ and≈. 
Lemma A.4. Suppose λ additively represents the i-likelihood relation
of b. Then (a) λ(C r) = {0}, (b) λ(C s∩b) = {0}, (c) λ(C srb) ⊆ R−−,
and (d) (∀h ∈ Hs) h ∩ b = argmaxt∈h

c∈t λ(c).
Proof. Let < denote the i-likelihood relation of b.
(a) Take any c ∈ C r . By the definition of C r , there is some t such
that c ∈ F(t). Then t ≈ t∪{c}by the definition of≈C r . This implies
c′∈t λ(c ′) =

c′∈t∪{c} λ(c ′) by representation (2). Finally, this
implies λ(c) = 0 since c ∉ t by c ∈ F(t) and the definition of F .
(b) Take any c ∈ C s ∩ b. By the definition of C s, there is some
t such that c ∈ F(t). Then t ≈ t ∪ {c} by the definition of ≈Cs .
This implies

c′∈t λ(c ′) =

c′∈t∪{c} λ(c ′) by representation (2).
Finally, this implies λ(c) = 0 since c ∉ t by c ∈ F(t) and the
definition of F .
(c) Take any c ∈ C s r b. By the definition of C s, there is some t
such that c ∈ F(t). Thus t ≻ t ∪ {c} by the definition of ≻Cs . This
implies

c′∈t λ(c ′) >

c′∈t∪{c} λ(c ′) by representation (2). This
implies λ(c) < 0.
(d) Take any h ∈ Hs and any to ∈ h. On the one hand, sup-
pose to ∈ h r b. Since b is a basement, there is some t∗ ∈ h ∩ b.
This implies t∗ ≻ to by the definition of ≻T s , which implies
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c∈t∗ λ(c) >

c∈to λ(c) by representation (2), which implies
to ∉ argmaxt ′∈h

c∈t ′ λ(c). On the other hand, suppose to ∈ h∩b.
Then consider any other t ∈ h. By the definitions of ≻T s and
≈T s , either to ≻T s t or to ≈T s t , and thus in either event we have
to < t . Hence by representation (2),

c∈to λ(c) ≥

c∈t λ(c).
Since this has been demonstrated for any t ∈ h, we have that
to ∈ argmaxt∈h

c∈t λ(c). 
Proof A.5 (For Theorem 4.2). (a)⇒(b) by Lemma 4.3. (b)⇒(c) by
Fact 4.1. (c)⇒(d) is trivial.
(d)⇒(a). Suppose (d) and define the sequence ⟨(σn, βn)⟩n by
(∀h ∈ Hs)(∀c ∈ F(h)) σn(c) = n
λ(c)
c′∈F(h)
nλ(c′)
and
(∀h ∈ Hs)(∀t ∈ h) βn(t) =

c∈t
(ρ ∪ σn)(c)
t ′∈h

c∈t ′
(ρ ∪ σn)(c) .
The limit of this sequence is consistent by the definition of consis-
tency. The limit is supported by b by an argument using the con-
clusions of Lemma A.4. (This type of construction is standard. The
first such construction appeared in Kreps andWilson, 1982, p. 887,
Lemma A.1 proof, first paragraph. Another appears in Streufert,
2014, LemmaA.7, where the conclusions of this paper’s LemmaA.4
are called λ ‘‘indicating’’ b.) 
Proof A.6 (ForProposition 5.1).Necessity of Justification. LemmaA.4
and the definition (5) of justification.
Sufficiency of Justification. Suppose λ justifies b and let < be the
i-likelihood relation of b.
(a) Suppose t1 ≻ t2. It must be shown thatc∈t1 λ(c) >c∈t2
λ(c). By the definition of≻, we have t1≻Cs t2 or t1≻T s t2.
In the first case, there is a c∗ ∈ F(t1) such that t1 ∪ {c∗} = t2
and c∗ ∈ C srb. Thenc∈t1 λ(c) >c∈t1∪{c∗} λ(c) =c∈t2 λ(c),
where the inequality holds because (1) c∗ ∉ t1 by c∗ ∈ F(t1) and
the definition of F and (2) λ(c∗) < 0 by c ∈ C s r b and (5c).
In the second case, there is an h ∈ Hs such that t1 ∈ h ∩ b and
t2 ∈ hr b. Thusc∈t1 λ(c) = maxt∈hc∈t λ(c) >c∈t2 λ(c) by
two applications of (5d).
(b) Suppose t1 ≈ t2. It must be shown that c∈t1 λ(c) =
c∈t2 λ(c). By the definition of ≈, we have t1≈Cs t2, or t1≈C r t2,
or t1≈T s t2.
In the first case, there is a c∗ ∈ C s ∩ b such that either [a]
c∗ ∈ F(t1) and t1 ∩ {c∗} = t2, or symmetrically [b] c∗ ∈ F(t2)
and t2 ∪ {c∗} = t1. In subcase [a],c∈t1 λ(c) =c∈t1∪{c∗} λ(c) =
c∈t2 λ(c), where the first equality holds because λ(c∗) = 0 by
c∗ ∈ C s ∩ b and (5b). Subcase [b] can be treated symmetrically.In the second case, there is a c∗ ∈ C r such that either [a] c∗ ∈
F(t1) and t1 ∩ {c∗} = t2, or symmetrically [b] c∗ ∈ F(t2) and t2 ∪
{c∗} = t1. In subcase [a],c∈t1 λ(c) = c∈t1∪{c∗} λ(c) = c∈t2
λ(c), where the first equality holds because λ(c∗) = 0 by c ∈ C r
and (5a). Subcase [b] can be treated symmetrically.
In the third case, there is an h ∈ Hs such that {t1, t2} ⊆ h ∩ b.
Thus

c∈t1 λ(c) = maxt∈h

c∈t λ(c) =

c∈t2 λ(c) by two appli-
cations of (5d). 
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